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Abstract
New mobility concepts are at the forefront of research and innovation in smart cities. The in-
troduction of connected and autonomous vehicles enables new possibilities in vehicle routing.
Specifically, knowing the origin and destination of each agent in the network can allow for real-
time routing of the vehicles to optimize network performance. However, this relies on individual
vehicles being “altruistic” i.e., being willing to accept an alternative non-preferred route in order
to achieve a network-level performance goal. In this work, we conduct a study to compare dif-
ferent levels of agent altruism and the resulting effect on the network-level traffic performance.
Specifically, this study compares the effects of different underlying urban structures on the over-
all network performance, and investigates which characteristics of the network make it possible
to realize routing improvements using a decentralized optimization router. The main finding is
that, with increased vehicle altruism, it is possible to balance traffic flow among the links of the
network. We show evidence that the decentralized optimization router is more effective with net-
works of high load while we study the influence of cities characteristics, in particular: networks
with a higher number of nodes (intersections) or edges (roads) per unit area allow for more possible
alternate routes, and thus higher potential to improve network performance.
Keywords: Smart Cities, Autonomous Vehicle, Traffic Flow, Distributed Route Planning
1. Introduction
New mobility concepts are at the forefront of research and innovation in smart cities and are
enabled by advances in intelligent infrastructures. The shift toward an autonomous vehicle (AV)
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fleet means that we will soon have the possibility to control the routes that individual vehicles
take. Even before AVs are prevalent on our roadways, vehicle connectivity via smartphone apps
(e.g., Waze, Google Maps, Apple Maps, Nokia HERE, etc.) already make it possible to suggest
individualized routes for each driver in the network, and optimize these routes based on some
desired network state. This is often referred to as a system optimal (SO) route assignment [1].
However, compliance to these routes is not enforceable. Furthermore, the extent to which these
companies coordinate to optimize at the system level is not known.
If routes are assigned to drivers based on what is best to reach the network state under some SO
criteria, this may not be the route that is best for each individual driver. Instead, depending on how
selfish they are, an individual driver may select the user equilibrium (UE) route, i.e. the route that
is optimal for each individual driver based on a greedy assessment of the route options [1]. While
selfish drivers may select the route that is best for them, more altruistic drivers may be willing to
accept the SO route assignment, while some drivers who have both selfish and altruistic traits may
select some hybrid route that has elements of both the SO and the UE route.
Finding SO routes has been an area of significant research over the last several decades and
generally is considered under dynamic traffic assignment (DTA), which dates back to the late
1970s [2, 3]. An excellent summary of early DTA efforts is provided by Peeta and Ziliakopou-
los [4]. Much of the existing early literature on DTA focuses on mathematical programming based
solutions to routing vehicles in fixed time steps [2]. Other approaches to finding optimal routing
include the formulation as an optimal control problem [5, 6, 7].
Many influential works have provided strategies for identifying optimal routing [8, 9, 10, 11].
More recently, the possibilities of conducting DTA with AVs has been considered, with many
aspects of the problem having been considered [12, 13, 14]. This work builds on prior efforts in
this area by considering an adaptive routing framework called TRAPP which applies decentralized
agent-based planning and optimization to optimize the operational efficiency of a city [15]. We
hence utilize a socio-technical approach that goes beyond the traditional approach of speed limits
and exploits cooperation between agents to maximize the utilization of the existing infrastructure.
Specifically, within this context, we consider the application of this adaptive routing framework
for a fleet of autonomous vehicles, and consider the impact of each vehicle’s selfishness (i.e.,
willingness to accept a non-optimal route to improve the goal of network optimality) on the overall
performance.
The overall idea behind our work is to improve vehicle routing on a network by exploring the
trade off between optimizing global and local objectives that the agents consider when selecting a
route. In this context, a global objective is a system-level objective such as reducing CO2 emissions
or balancing the load assigned to each link in the network, while a local objective is one that is
specific to an individual vehicle, such as travel time. The general assumption is that in pursuing
the global objective, the efficiency of the entire network is improved. In particular, we assume that
even if some of the agents pursue a mix of UE and SO routing, this can benefit all agents in the
system, including the selfish ones, and still improve the efficiency of the network.
The specific mechanisms to incentivize travel behavior or nudge drivers to become “altruistic”
and take SO routes are the focus of several other works [16, 17, 18], and are beyond the scope of
this work. Instead, assuming an incentivization mechanism exists, we try to answer the question:
What degree of altruism is required by the agents to see system-level benefits and to what extent
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is the required altruism dependent on the city’s urban structure and traffic level in the network?
In the context of employing multi-agent learning to optimize route planning, in this paper, we
make the following contributions:
• We present a study that compares different altruism levels of agents (autonomous vehicles)
and their effect on the overall traffic performance.
• We compare such effects across cities with different characteristics and investigate which
characteristics make it possible to observe positive traffic effects via increased altruism lev-
els.
• The understanding of how different traffic levels in the network influence the effectiveness
of alternative optimized routes.
• The applicability of an open-source software framework1 to different large-scale urban trans-
port networks. The framework integrates a well-known traffic simulator with a decentralized
agent-based planner and allows for performing studies that employ multi-agent learning in
optimizing route planning.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2, technical background on the
simulation tool, the optimization tool, and their integration are presented. The design of our study
is presented in Section 3; the study results and their interpretation are presented in Section 4.
Finally, the conclusions are provided in Section 5, and possible directions for future work are also
discussed.
2. Technical Background
In order to investigate the effect of local and global objectives in dynamic traffic assignment
via agent-based planning, we performed a simulation study. In this section, we describe in detail
the traffic simulator–SUMO–and the agent-based planning framework–EPOS–we used and how
they were integrated for the purposes of our study.
2.1. Traffic Simulation with SUMO and TraCI
SUMO (Simulation of Urban MObility) is a well-known open-source microscopic traffic sim-
ulator [19]. It can be used for simulating up to hundreds of thousands of vehicles in complex,
realistic city networks (which can be extracted e.g. from OpenStreetMaps) that include traffic sig-
nals, multiple lanes per street, speed limits per street, different types of streets (for cars, bicycles
or pedestrians), among other features [20, 21]. High realism is achieved in SUMO by simulating
acceleration and deceleration of cars in traffic lights and intersections, vehicle manoeuvres, and by
allowing for different driving styles (e.g. aggressive drivers). All the above features make SUMO
a mature tool for performing traffic simulation and analysis.
1TRAPP, available at https://github.com/iliasger/TRAPP
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In our experiments, we relied on a module of SUMO that can be used for controlling a SUMO
simulation via Python [22]. TraCI (Traffic Control Interface) provides a convenient interface for
both inspecting different attributes of the simulation and calculating performance indicators out of
them (e.g. duration of each car trip, number of cars on each street at each simulated time point),
but also for intervening and changing aspects of the SUMO simulation. For instance, TraCI allows
to change the route assigned to a car–a feature that we used in our experiments.
In order to experiment with dynamic route assignment, we implemented three different routers
in Python. All routers rely on the internal representation of a city network as a graph and perform
a Dijkstra algorithm to find the shortest path between an initial position A and a destination B.
The difference of the routers rely on what they consider as cost of an edge (street). In the first
router such a cost is the length of the street, resulting in routes of minimal overall length. In the
second router, the cost is the inverse of the maximum speed allowed on a street, resulting in routes
of maximum overall speed. In the third router, the cost is formed by the length of a street divided
by the maximum speed allowed on the street, resulting in routes of minimal length and maximum
overall speed.
In our experiments, each router produced a single route for each trip, hence each car could
select among three different routes to navigate from A to B. Which route to choose was a decision
that involved agent-based planning via EPOS, described next.
2.2. Traffic Optimization with EPOS
EPOS (Economic Planning and Optimized Selections) is a decentralized multi-agent optimiza-
tion framework written in Java [23]. EPOS can be used for efficiently solving complex multi-
objective combinatorial problems via participatory collective learning. In particular, EPOS as-
sumes that a number of agents needs to coordinate their decisions in order to effectively use a
shared medium such a power grid or a set of streets. Each agent’s decisions may influence the
decision of other agents, i.e. non-linear cost functions. The problem that EPOS solves is to allow
each agent to take decisions that considers both local and global objectives with the minimum
amount of interaction with the other agents. This is achieved by having agents in EPOS self-
organize in tree topologies over which they can perform efficient aggregation and decision-making
in an iterative fashion: consecutive child-parent interactions in the bottom-up phase, followed by
parent-child interactions in the top-down phase. In the following, we will describe EPOS only to
extent necessary for this study, we refer the interested reader to [23] for more details.
In this study, an EPOS agent is a self-driving car. Decision making in EPOS involves selecting
a plan from a finite set of plans for each agent. In our setting, a plan corresponds to a route
from a position A to a destination B. As explained in the previous subsection, we equipped each
self-driving car with the ability to select among three possible routes, each corresponding to one
of the three available routers (“minimum length”, “maximum speed”, and “combined length and
speed” router). Nevertheless, our setting can be easily extended to accommodate more routes
and routers, even routers that only serve specific cars (essentially creating agents that have more
options). EPOS is then used by the self-driving cars in our study so that each car selects one route
to follow out of the three options they have (Figure 1).
A plan is represented as a vector of real values in EPOS, each representing the “contribution”
of the agent to the shared medium. In our study, the shared medium is the set of all streets in a city.
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Figure 1: Plan specification and selection via inter-operation of SUMO and EPOS in our study.
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A plan hence becomes a vector of real values containing the expected utilization of each street by
the car in the corresponding route for a specific planning horizon (e.g. 30 minutes). For instance,
assuming a city consisting of only four streets, A, B, C, D, a route that only uses A is encoded
as X, 0, 0, 0, where X depends on the expected occupancy of A (which is calculated based
on the street length, vehicle length and expected time spent on the street). Plan 2 of agent n in
Figure 1 is a concrete such example with X = 0.3.
Each plan comes with a a cost denoting the dislike of the agent for this plan. Agents can
express their preferences for plans that they generate by lowering the cost of preferred plans. For
instance, plan 3 for agent n in Figure 1 is preferred over plans 1 and 2. In our study, we assign costs
to plans based on agents’ preferences mined from historical (simulated) runs of the self-driving
cars. We describe this in detail in Section 3.
In EPOS, an agent makes a plan selection based on three criteria: (i) global cost (GC), (ii) local
cost (LC), and (iii) unfairness (U). For our study, we model global cost as the variance of street
utilization when considering the utilization contributed by all cars. (global cost is computed by
EPOS by first summing up element-wise all the selected plans and then calculating the variance
of the resulting vector.) Our model of global cost is a natural one, since global cost represents
what needs to be optimized at a system level. In our case, this is the variance of street utilization,
since we would like to balance the self-driving cars in the available streets in order to avoid traffic
externalities. Local cost is simply the cost of each plan, as provided by each agent (see Figure 1).
Finally, unfairness captures how important is for the agent that the overall solution creates equal
dissatisfaction among the agents; it is computed as the variance over the cost of the selected plans.
The final cost of a plan is a weighted sum of the three criteria:
(1− α− β)GC + αU + βLC (1)
where α and β are real values in [0,1].
Since the objective of each agent is to select the plan with the lowest final cost, it becomes
apparent that setting α = 0 assumes that fairness concerns play no role in the optimization process.
In our study, we have always used α = 0 and experimented with different values of β. It is
important to note that high values of β represent more selfish agents, since they care more about
their local cost than the global one. Conversely, lower values of β represent more altruistic agents.
On the extreme cases, β = 0 models completely altruistic agents, whereas β = 1 completely
selfish ones.
2.3. Integration of SUMO and EPOS
In this study, we couple each car present in SUMO to an agent present in EPOS. Using the
TRAPP framework [15] developed in our earlier work, we are able to run SUMO simulations
which involve invoking EPOS at predefined time points (e.g. at the beginning of the simulation and
also periodically with a predefined period). Every time EPOS is invoked, the Python-controlled
simulation pauses and waits for the EPOS run to complete. After completion, the routes selected
by EPOS are applied to the active simulation and the simulation resumes.
From the user’s perspective, the simulation can be configured with different maps and different
number of cars, and different values of the β parameter that controls the level of altruism of agents
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in EPOS. The duration of the simulation can also be configured, along with data to be logged
(e.g. duration of trips, utilization of streets). In our experiments, in order to evaluate the effect of
balancing the cars in a city network on the duration of trips—the main performance indicator for
the passengers of self-driving cars—we log the durations of all completed trips.
3. Study Design
Out of the many trade-offs in decentralized optimization of traffic, in this paper we focus on
the trade-off between optimizing for local costs of the individual agents and the global costs of the
network as a whole to answer the questions:
1. Can increasing the altruism of traffic agents lead to positive traffic effects related to reduced
trip times?
2. If yes, what is the level of altruism necessary for observing such positive effects under varied
level of traffic in the network?
3. Which are the city attributes and characteristics that determine whether such positive effects
are observed?
To investigate the above questions, we used the TRAPP framework that integrates SUMO
and traCI, a well-known traffic simulator, with EPOS, a decentralized optimization framework, as
described in the previous section. We performed several simulation runs using different values of
the β parameter of EPOS on different traffic settings– city maps and traffic levels– as described in
the rest of this Section. We also provide the open-source software TRAPP, together with concrete
replication instructions online2.
As explained in the previous Section, changing β leads to changing the altruism level of EPOS
agents. For each traffic setting (explained next), we performed a systematic parameter sweep of
β starting from 1 (corresponding to completely selfish agents) to 0 (corresponding to completely
altruistic agents) with a step of 0.1. We kept all other TRAPP parameters constant in order to
observe the effect of changing β alone. For each β value, we performed 5 simulation runs with
different random seeds, which affect the initial positions and destinations of cars, to obtain sta-
tistical validity. Hence, for each traffic setting we performed a total of 5x11 = 55 simulation
runs.
We consider a simulation run to be the simulation of a specific number of cars on the spe-
cific city network for a set amount of time–the simulation horizon. The initial positions of cars
are selected based on the population distribution of city districts; their destinations are randomly
selected. EPOS is invoked only at the beginning of each run, with a planning horizon equal to
the simulation horizon, and selects one route for each car. Then, cars follow their routes without
further planning. Once a car completes its trip, it picks another random destination and retrieves a
route to it via its preferred router (the one with the lowest cost). This ensures that the number of
cars remains constant for the whole duration of a run. After a run is completed, the durations of
2https://github.com/iliasger/TRAPP/blob/experiments/Beta_Alpha_Testing_
README.md
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City, State Size Density Total pop. # Zip codes % Commute by car
Manhattan, NY 51 km2 19,658 p/km2 1,002,576 31 5.8
Duluth, MN 236 km2 493 p/km2 116,688 11 74.4
Annapolis, MD 21 km2 2,945 p/km2 61,837 4 73
Boulder, CO 540 km2 224 p/km2 120,932 6 64.3
Table 1: Summary statistics for the four cities compared in our study.
City, State Nodes Edges Num. of cars Density (number of cars / total street length)
Manhattan, NY 6,758 12,658 10,000 0.0093
Duluth, MN 5,607 14,317 14,000 0.0065
Annapolis, MD 2,555 5,691 8,000 0.0147
Boulder, CO 7,740 16,625 13,000 0.0104
Table 2: SUMO traffic settings for the four cities compared in our study.
the fist trip of each car that was completed are analyzed to determine the effect of EPOS optimiza-
tion with the particular β value on traffic. In particular, we compute the average of all logged trip
overheads, where a trip overhead is an actual trip duration divided by the theoretical trip duration
if the car would drive alone in maximum speed at all times.
A traffic setting in our study is defined by the city map and the number of cars in the simulation.
To understand the impact of urban structure on the ability to optimize trip routing via EPOS, the
study considers four cities, Annapolis, Boulder, Duluth, and the borough of Manhattan in New
York City. All of the cities used for the comparative study are located in the United States for
the consistency of ZIP codes, census data, and commute data. These cities were also chosen for
their diversity of urban infrastructure, including their area, population size, population density, and
street organization (Table 1).
The number of cars used for each simulation run was determined in the following way. We
aim to compare cities based on the morning commute time. Hence, we first set the simulation
horizon of a simulation run to 30 minutes, which roughly correlates to the average commute time
in the US of 25.5 minutes. Then, we calculate the total number of commuting trips using the
percentage of drivers in each city that drive alone and the total population of the city from the
2010 census (Table 1). This total number of commuting trips is divided by six, as typical morning
peak traffic is from 6:30 am to 9:30 am, covering six half-hour time periods. Thus, the assumption
that commuters are uniformly distributed in time over the morning commute is implicitly made.
The resulting number of cars per city is depicted in Table 2. The number of cars and the simulation
horizon thus represent a period of peak traffic of a city’s morning commute.
To make the study more realistic, it is important to consider additional factors that contribute
to traffic flow, like traffic route patterns. We used a simplified model for traffic patterns based on
the assumption that during peak morning traffic people are driving from their places of residence
to their places of work. In our model, cities are divided into districts (squares in the map) with
8
(a) Manhattan (b) Duluth
(c) Boulder (d) Annapolis
Figure 2: The different maps used in our study.
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Metric Minimum Maximum Range (Maximum - Minimum)
local cost 0.07438 0.20539 0.13100
global cost 0.00013 0.00131 0.00118
trip overhead 2.67147 6.29150 3.62002
Table 3: Cross-city statistics of the three metrics in our study.
certain number of residents—population. We computed a district’s population by adding up the
population of all ZIP codes whose centroids lie within the district. (Population per ZIP code
is also obtained by the US 2010 Census data.) Then, we calculated the distribution of a city’s
population in districts. Using this distribution, cars’ initial positions are assigned to districts; their
specific position (a street within a district) is selected uniformly at random. Each trip destination
is randomly selected within the city using a uniform distribution in space (without considering
districts). This simplified destination selection method is used for lack of consistent data for the
distribution of workplaces in cities.
In order to prepare the SUMO maps of the different cities for our study we first used OSM
Web Wizard to extract SUMO networks from Open Street Maps. We then cleaned each map
using SUMO’s NETEDIT utility, a graphical network editor, to delete any unnecessary edges that
extended beyond the each city’s ZIP codes. Finally, we used SUMO’s NETCONVERT utility to
remove any edges that could not accommodate passenger vehicles, removing any edges for buses,
bikes, pedestrians, and trains from the maps. The number of nodes (intersections) and edges
(streets), along with a custom density metric of the resulting SUMO maps are listed in Table 2,
while the different maps are depicted in Figure 2.
Finally, for each traffic setting, we conducted a number of baseline simulation runs to mine the
cost that each agent associates with each router. The difference from the normal simulation runs
that were used to derive the results is that in the baseline runs EPOS was not invoked. Instead, each
car was selecting a router at random to perform a trip and logging the trip’s overhead. For each
traffic setting, we performed 100 baseline runs with different random seeds. We then calculated
the average trip overhead per car per router, which became the cost of that particular router for that
car. These costs were used to characterize the local objective of each agent in EPOS.
4. Study Results
In this section, we summarize the results obtained from running TRAPP on four different cities
with differing urban structure. As already mentioned, for each traffic setting (city map and number
of cars), 5 simulation runs were conducted for each of the 11 selfishness (β) values, ranging from
β = 0 to β = 1. The resulting traffic performance in each traffic setting and β value is described
in this section.
Note that for each of the result metrics (local cost, global cost, and trip overhead) we present
normalized values to facilitate cross-city comparisons and interpretation. We perform a min-max
normalization in which we first subtract the minimum value (observed for the metric across all
cities) from the value being transformed and then divide by the value range of the metric (obtained
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by subtracting the minimum value observed for the metric across all cities from the maximum
one). For reference, Table 3 provides an overview of the minimum, maximum, and corresponding
ranges of the three metrics.
(a) Manhattan (b) Duluth
(c) Boulder (d) Annapolis
Figure 3: Boxplots of local cost for all four cities as a function of selfishness β. Blue dots represent averages (over
5 runs). The trend shows that in all four cities, the local cost is constant except for the completely altruistic case
(β = 0), where local cost is significantly increased.
4.1. Local cost
The local cost of a run represents the average of the costs of the selected routes for the run, as
reported by EPOS. This gives an estimate of how much agents are dissatisfied — lower values of
local cost are better. Figure 3 depicts the (normalized) local costs of all runs performed for each
traffic setting and for each β value.
As a first observation, local cost is not the same for all cities, which captures the fact that some
settings are inherently more costly to navigate than others. This is of course related also to the
way we calculate the cost of a route for each car: each route inherits the cost of its router, which
is calculated as the normalized average of trip overheads measured over all baseline runs that used
the particular router. Some settings yield inherently higher overheads and hence higher local costs
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(a) Manhattan (b) Duluth
(c) Boulder (d) Annapolis
Figure 4: Boxplots of global cost for all four cities as a function of selfishness β, showing in increasing global cost
with increased selfishness, meaning that when agents are more selfish, the overall cost for all agents is increased. Blue
dots represent averages (over 5 runs).
than others. This is why local costs in Manhattan and Annapolis are higher and in Duluth and
Boulder.
The main pattern that emerges though for all cities is the following. As β is reduced, local
cost remains almost unaffected until β reaches 0. At this point, local cost increases sharply. The
percentage increase between the highest value (1) and lowest value (0) of β is 20% for Manhattan,
30% for Duluth, 77% for Boulder, and 66% for Annapolis.
4.2. Global cost
The global cost of a run represents the expected average variance of street utilization for the
run, as reported by EPOS. This gives an estimate of an important system-level objective of EPOS,
i.e. to balance the presence of cars in the streets as much as possible (with the aim to avoid traffic
externalities). Figure 4 depicts the (normalized) global costs of all runs performed for each traffic
setting and for each β value.
Similar to local cost, global cost primarily depends on the setting, with Boulder having the
highest global costs and Manhattan the lowest overall. With varying β , we see the inverse trend
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than local costs: global cost uniformly decreases going from β = 1 to β = 0. This is expected,
since the more important the global objective becomes for EPOS, the more EPOS tries to decrease
the variance in street utilization. However, in some settings the transition is more smooth than
others (e.g. Duluth), where we observe sharper changes in the global cost (e.g. Manhattan). The
percentage decrease between the highest value (1) and lowest value (0) of β is 50% for Manhattan,
33% for Duluth, 34% for Boulder, and 20% for Annapolis.
(a) Manhattan (b) Duluth
(c) Boulder (d) Annapolis
Figure 5: Boxplots of trip overheads for all four cities showing an increasing trend with selfishness β for Manhattan
and Duluth (top), and no discernible trend with respect to selfishness β for Boulder and Annapolis (bottom). Blue
dots represent averages (over 5 runs).
4.3. Trip overheads
Trip overhead is the main metric we used to evaluate the effectiveness of our overall approach.
Recall that trip overhead is computed as the actual trip duration divided by the theoretical trip
duration if the car would drive at the maximum allowable speed throughout. In particular, for
each setting we calculated the mean of the trip overheads corresponding to the first trip of each
car. This provides an estimate of the overall utility of the system – with lower mean trip overhead
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corresponding to faster trips and hence higher system utility. Figure 5 depicts the (normalized)
mean trip overheads of all runs performed for each traffic setting and for each β value.
The first observation is that trip overhead clearly depends on the setting, with Annapolis hav-
ing the highest values and Duluth the lowest. With varying β values, trip overhead shows no
discernible trend, except for two cases: Manhattan with β = 0 and Duluth with β = 0 both show a
statistically significant decrease in the trip overhead, as can be observed in Figures 7a and 7b, re-
spectively. This trend is however not observed for Boulder (Figure 7c) and Annapolis (Figure 7d).
4.4. Influence of traffic level
To clarify the influence of the route optimization on the trip overhead, it is hypothesized here
that the effect of optimization can be easier observed when the network load, i.e. traffic level, is at
a critical state. In other words, we assume that balancing of traffic flows decreases trip overhead
only if there is a certain amount of traffic congestion in the network. Intuitively, alternative routes
in a network free of traffic congestion are likely to increase travel times, while alternative routes
in a congested networks are likely to reduce them.
Given the large spectrum of the different performed experiments on large-scale networks, sim-
ulations are very computationally costly. For this reason, the aforementioned hypothesis is as-
sessed on a smaller scale network. In particular, we use the city of Eichsta¨tt and varying number
of cars ranging from 100 to 1500 with a step of 100 (see Figure 6). Cars have random starting
points and random destinations. Similar to the other experiments, when a car reaches a destination
it picks another one to drive to; this ensures that the total number of cars in a run remains constant.
Each run has a duration of 800 SUMO ticks, which is long enough to ensure that almost all the ini-
tial trips of each car are completed. Similar to the other experiments, for each run, we calculate the
mean of the trip overheads of these trips, along with the local and global costs reported by EPOS.
EPOS is invoked at the beginning of each run. In these experiments, we investigate the influence
of total altruism (β=0) versus total selfishness (β=1, the baseline) under different number of cars.
Each setting (corresponding to number of cars and the beta value), is run five times with different
random seeds.
Figure 6 illustrates the results of median overhead, median global cost, and median local cost
over the five runs per case. With respect to trip overheads, there is a critical state between 400 and
500 cars after which altruistic agents following the alternative routes consistently reduce the trip
overhead. In a similar vein, we observe a sharp increase in the difference of global cost between
altruistic and selfish agents for number of cars starting from 700 on. In other words, the reduction
of trip overhead at a critical number of cars in the network is also associated with the optimization
capacity of the traffic flows, indicated by the significant performance divergence between altruistic
and selfish agents as the number of cars increases. On the contrary, local costs show a consistent
difference between altruistic and selfish agents across all number of cars.
4.5. Interpretation of results
In this subsection, we provide our interpretation of the results described in the previous sub-
sections and attempt to answer the questions stated in our study design.
First, the effect of changing the level of drivers’ altruism (β value) is both clear and consistent
across city settings for both the local and global cost. Local cost is practically unaffected for β
14
(a) Trip overhead. (b) Global cost.
(c) Local cost.
Figure 6: Median results (over 5 random runs) for different number of cars in Eichsta¨tt.
values other than 0 and increases sharply when complete altruism is in place (β = 0). In complete
altruism, optimization in EPOS takes into account only the global objective (“reduce the variance
of street utilization”) without taking the agents’ preferences into account. Even slight consider-
ation of agents’ preferences (e.g. β = 0.1 or 0.2) drastically reduces the cost that the agents pay
for the optimization to take place. The same “all or nothing” pattern is present in the evolution
of global costs: even slight introduction of selfish behavior is enough to increase the global cost
considerably. Still, in contrast to local costs, the global costs show a more gradual value change
by increasing the altruism level.
Looking at the results on trip overheads, we conclude that it is possible to use EPOS with
altruistic agents, distribute the cars more evenly in the streets and, as a result, reduce the overall
trip overheads, especially when the network is at a critical high traffic flow state.
We clearly see such a positive traffic effect on average overhead values when setting β = 0
for Manhattan and Duluth. However, such an effect (i) is only present for the case of complete
15
City, State
AVG Max Min Edges / Nodes /
street size street size street size total street length total street length
Manhattan, NY 84 m 2777 m 0.1 m 0.0117 0.0062
Duluth, MN 149 m 5460 m 0.1 m 0.0066 0.0026
Annapolis, MD 95 m 2764 m 0.1 m 0.0104 0.0047
Boulder, CO 74 m 4424 m 0.1 m 0.0133 0.0062
Table 4: Further characteristics of the traffic networks of the cities considered in our study.
altruism (β = 0), and (ii) is not present in Boulder and Annapolis.
While assessing the critical traffic flow state of these urban networks is computationally chal-
lenging and out of the scope of this paper, we turn our attention to the characteristics of different
city maps. In particular, we calculated the average, maximum, and minimum street size, and also
observed the whole distributions of the street sizes per city (not shown here). We also divided the
number of edges (streets) and nodes (intersections) by the total street length to obtain metrics of
density of the map. The different measurements are depicted in Table 4 and there is no correlation
between the values of these characteristics and the fact that balancing is effective in Manhattan
and Duluth and not in Annapolis and Boulder.
We then turned our attention to EPOS plans. For the balancing effect to take place, (i) some
cars need to select a different router from their preferred one, (ii) the different router needs to
provide a different route than the one provided by the preferred router. To investigate (i), we
plotted the percentage of router utilization for each setting and for each β value (Figure 7). In
all settings, the distribution of router utilization changed significantly when setting β to 0. This
means that EPOS did indeed force several cars to select non-preferred routers in all settings.
These observations show that neither the structural properties of the particular networks nor
particular route plans of EPOS explain the insignificant effect on trip overheads in certain cases.
Therefore, the clear effect of traffic load on the network of Eichsta¨tt is hypothesized as the one
explaining the low performance in Boulder and Annapolis. Future work will confirm this using a
large-scale computational infrastructure to support such ambitious research.
5. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we focused on new mobility concepts in smart cities and investigated the use of
multi-agent learning in optimizing route planning. In particular, considering each (potentially au-
tonomous) car as an agent that has several plans, i.e. routes to a destination, and can considers both
local and global objectives, we investigated whether increasing the altruism of the agents can have
a positive effect on the overall performance of traffic under varying traffic levels. We performed
detailed measurements to answer the above question using a simulation framework that integrates
SUMO, a well-known traffic simulator, and EPOS, a decentralized agent-based framework. Our
study focused on rush hour traffic in four US cities and found that (i) load balancing can indeed be
achieved by increasing the agents’ altruism, (ii) whether a positive effect on network performance
can be observed depends on the characteristics of the cities and, in particular, on the density of the
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(a) Manhattan (b) Duluth
(c) Boulder (d) Annapolis
Figure 7: Distribution of selected routers that route cars based on minimum length of streets (minlength), maximum
speed allowed on streets (maxspeed), or based on a combination of the two (balanced) for different β values and
different traffic settings.
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city network as well as (iii) the level of traffic in the network.
As future work, we would like to compare further cities under varying traffic level and relate
their (topological) characteristics with their capacity to optimize traffic flows. Finally, a very
interesting direction of research concerns the addition of the fairness objective in the decision
making of agents in our setting.
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